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notice appears on all such copies.Trade Liberalization and International Merger in Cournot Industries:
The Case of Barley Malting in North America
 Abstract 
The argument that we put forward and examine in this paper is that when a free trade
policy merges formally distinct markets characterized by stable Cournot oligopolies and
having similar cost structures, additional incentives are created for mergers within the
newly combined industry that affect the gains from free trade. We use a Cournot-Nash
oligopoly model to examine the incentives for malting company mergers following
Canadian-U.S. free trade agreement. Mergers reduce the free trade gains to malt
consumers and malt barley producers, while the producer surplus in the malting industry
increases.  Overall, mergers increase the total gains from free trade beyond those without
mergers1The data on plant capacities, although not publicly available, are widely known within
the industry.  The data that we received from three separate industry sources were consistent.
1
Open borders lead to increased discipline in industry pricing in the domestic market in
much the same way they discipline domestic government policy (see Sumner and Halstrom 1997). 
The argument examined in this paper is that when a free trade policy creates a single market from
formally distinct markets, the increased number of firms in the marketplace increases competition
and drives down prices, which under some conditions increases the incentive for mergers.
The analysis was motivated by observation of the malting barley industry in Canada and
the United States.  In 1985, prior to the Canadian-U.S. Trade Agreement (FTA), the two domestic
markets for barley malt were distinctly separated by import license requirements into Canada and
import tariffs in the United States.  Four firms controlled 90 percent of the Canadian malting
capacity, while six firms controlled over 80 percent of the U.S. malting capacity before FTA.
1 
FTA created a free trade area by removing import licensing requirements and eliminating
tariffs for both malting barley and barley malt, a process begun in 1987 and largely completed by
1995.   In the period from 1985 to 1995, there were a number of mergers and joint ventures
resulting in firms with plants on both sides of the border. As a result of these mergers, in 1995 five
firms owned 80 percent of the malting capacity in the merged Canadian-U.S. market.  Interestingly
enough, despite all of the merger activity among malting firms there were very few plant closures
and very little new capacity was built.  Even new entrants to this industry purchased the assets of
existing firms, rather than building new plants.  2
Industry Description and a Summary of Trade Agreements
There are reasons to believe that malting technology is very similar across countries. 
Barley malting is a very old process that has developed over centuries. Much of the specialized
equipment for barley malting is sold internationally.   There is also mobility of human capital
moving between plants and between countries.   
In 1985 the Canadian malting industry was comprised of four firms: Canada Malt, Prairie
Malt, Dominion Malt, and Westcan Malting. These firms had a combined capacity of 873,000
metric tons, and are held to be operating at 80 percent of capacity (see Johnson and Wilson, 1994). 
Canada Malt was by far the largest of these firms with over 53 percent of total Canadian malt
capacity.  Malt exports from Canada in 1986 totaled more than 300,000 metric tons; 13 percent of
total exports were shipped to the United States.  Two Canadian brewers  Molson and Labatt 
jointly held 59 percent of the ownership of Canada Malt.  Prior to FTA the malting margins for the
domestic sales of malt were effectively determined within the malting industry in Canada.  Import
licenses and tariffs largely prevented malt and beer imports into Canada.   The Canadian Wheat
Board (CWB) largely controlled the price for the 30 to 40 percent of Canadian barley malted and
sold internationally. 
In 1985 five U.S. firms other than brewers had capacity of 2,025,181 metric tons, again
thought to operate at 80 percent  of capacity.  Malting capacity o f 647,083 metric tons was owned
by U.S. brewers. Exports from the United States have historically been quite limited; most malt
exports are tied to the USDA’s Export Enhancement Program (see Johnson and Wilson 1994). 2One plant was closed in Thunder Bay and one was built in Alberta during the period of
interest.  Both these plants were owned by Canada Malt and the result was a small change in total
capacity (approximately 50,000 metric tons). One plant was closed in Thunder Bay and one was
built in Alberta during the period of interest.  Both these plants were owned by Canada Malt and
the result was a small change in total capacity (approximately 50,000 metric tons).
3
Malting margins in the United States were protected from import competition by a tariff on malt
that was three times as large as the tariff on barley.  
The complete implementation of FTA created one market for Canadian and U.S. malting
industries.  By 1995 the transition to a single Canadian-US. malt market was effectively complete.
The effects of FTA on the malting industry structure were primarily on ownership of existing
plants rather than on construction of new plants or on shut down of old facilities.
2  There were six
important changes in malting firm ownership, all of which resulted in increased concentration in
the Canadian-US malting industry.
The first malting industry change was the purchase of Great Western Malting by Canada
Malt in 1988, making Canada Malt the largest firm in the new merged North American industry. 
The second change was a purchase by Schrier of 51 percent of Prairie Malt in 1989 (the remaining
ownership was held by the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, a producers’ group).  The third change was
Archer Daniel Midland’s purchase of 65 percent of Dominion Malting.  The fourth change was a
joint venture between Cargill and Ladish in 1991, marking Cargill’s entry into the Canadian-U.S.
Malting industry.  The fifth change was a new plant (85,000 metric ton capacity, 3 percent of total
industry capacity) constructed by Rahr in Alberta.  Finally, ConAgra entered the North American
malting market by purchasing 70 percent of Canada Malt, an effort finalized in 1996.3Note however that the Bertrand model can give rise to the Cournot outcome if the
assumption of unlimited capacity is relaxed (see Carlton and Perloff 1994 for a discussion).
4  Aumann 1973 finds a somewhat similar result using the notion of the core and
heterogeneous utility functions among traders, where a monopolist may do better to split into a
number of competitive firms; this possibility, however, is not present when all firms strive to
maximize profits.
4
Modeling the Canadian-U.S. Barley Industry
Firm Behavior
There are numerous models of the economic behavior of oligopolies that range from
perfectly competitive to collusive monopolistic and monopsonistic behavior (Carlton and Perloff,
1994).  The range of behavior attributed to oligopolies ranges from, at one extreme a price-setting
model by Bertrand where the outcome is perfectly competitive behavior and, at the other extreme,
the cartel theory where the oligopoly colludes to maximize joint profits as a cartel.
3  Neither of
these two extremes are empirically appealing for barley malting.  The model of Cournot-Nash
behavior, where each firm considers the output of all other plants as given when output is chosen,
provides a tractable and consistent intermediate case. See Fjell and Pal (1996) and Liu (1996) for
examples of Cournot-Nash models.
The economics of mergers have been examined using the Cournot-Nash framework.
Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) assume that n identical Cournot firms, all with constant
marginal costs, operate within a market and achieve a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  They show that
mergers have the potential to decrease profits of the merging entities for mergers that do not
include all of the firms within a market and where no cost savings are possible from the mergers
within this identical constant cost industry.
4 5
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) consider many components important for understanding the
results of  horizontal mergers between Cournot firms. They use homogenous goods and an
exogenously determined number of firms to assess the welfare implications for mergers for a
number of demand and cost specifications. 
There are two primary differences between our application and previous literature.  First,
we evaluate the welfare implications of multiple mergers within an industry, not only one merger
between two firms.  Second, although savings in fixed costs play an important role for the welfare
analysis in both Head and Ries, and in Levin, they do not in our application.  As we discussed
earlier, these mergers were not accompanied by plant closures.  Furthermore, the large distances
between merged firms’ plant locations, and the significant differences in the barley grown within
these plant locations preclude substantial firm research and development cost savings. 
Azzam and Schroeter (1995) apply a Cournot oligopoly model to the U.S. beef packing
industry.  They rely, as we do in our analysis, on previous estimates of key parameters to carry out
their estimation.  Most importantly, they model mergers as providing cost reductions, requiring
tradeoffs between the social gains from cost reductions with the social losses from decreased
competition.  The primary difference between Azzam and Schroeter’s application and ours is that
we have an important external shock (FTA) that prompted the initiation of mergers.
Our simulation model views the Canadian-U.S. barley market at two time periods, pre- and
post-trade liberalization.  We assume that both the Canadian and the U.S. malting industries were
operating as separate and stable Cournot oligopolies before trade liberalization.5Note that achievable economies of scale in this industry are unlikely to be present at
current production levels for two reasons.  First, there were a number of firms producing under
each country's stable Cournot equilibrium before the free trade agreement.  Second, when
mergers or joint ventures occurred after the free trade agreement, they have not been





Demand and Cost Functions. 
Linear demand for homogeneous malt in each country is given by p(X) = abX, where X is the
total output produced by n firms and a, b > 0.  These firms face an upward sloping supply curve
for malting barley.  The supply curve for malting barley is s(X) =  g + dX, where X is the malt
equivalent of barley for the industry and d > 0.  The linear derived demand for malting services is
given by subtracting barley supply from malt demand, giving pms(X) = a - bX, again a linear
function.  The marginal revenue for a single malting firm in this Cournot malting industry is:  MRi
= a - bX-i - 2bXi , where X-i is the production of all firms except i and Xi is the output of firm i.
Since malting firms vary greatly in output, we allow their cost functions to vary.  We know
only that these firms have survived and that their outputs are considerably different; we do not
know their profits.  The linear marginal cost curve for firm i , derived from a quadratic cost
function is given by:  MCi = e  + ci Xi, where ci > 0 and e represents a common intercept across
firms.
5  The output from firm i, given the demand and marginal cost curves, can be found by
setting the marginal revenue equal to the marginal costs, giving:
(1)  
Linear demand and marginal cost curves satisfy the conditions for equilibrium in Farrell and
Shapiro (and most theory for Cournot equilibria)  the reaction curves slope downward, and cost6Industry sources take barley to be 60 percent of the price of malt.  The barley price of
$133 per metric ton is an approximate current price.
7
intersects demand from below.  Our linear marginal cost structure (e, ci ) was constrained to
parsimoniously match observable behavior in which firms vary widely in output and small firms
remain in production with trade liberalization. 
The Impacts of the Free Trade Agreement on the Canadian-U.S. Malting Industry
Three static regimes for the malting industry are examined: pre-FTA, post-FTA allowing
no mergers, and post-FTA after mergers.  The following constructed curves were common to all
three regimes:  a demand curve within each country, each firm’s premerger marginal cost function,
and the supply curve for barley in each country.  The marginal cost curve went through the origin
for each firm (i.e. e = 0).  The malting plants that were owned by the brewing industry were
excluded throughout the analysis since their malt output was traded internally.  A Cournot-Nash
outcome was estimated for each of the three regimes. 
Before FTA the four firms in Canada were assumed to face a linear demand curve for malt
that was separate from the linear demand curve faced by the seven U.S. malting firms.  The
Canadian malt demand curve was made somewhat more elastic (-2.0 versus -1.0)  to account for a
larger proportion of exports.  After FTA these separate linear demand curves were horizontally
summed to create a single Canadian-U.S. demand. 
As a starting point for comparison, we assumed that each plant was producing at 80 percent
of capacity, the price of barley was $133 per metric ton, and barley costs made up 60 percent of
the $222 per metric ton price of malt (all prices in U.S. dollars).
6  The marginal cost for each firm
was calculated to be consistent with the observed prices and outputs, assuming Cournot8
conjectures for each firm. The prices, costs, and quantities were then used to calculate firm profits,
malt consumer surplus, and malting barley producer surplus. 
To examine the effects of free trade and the subsequent mergers, the pre-FTA outcomes
from the separate and stable Cournot oligopolies were compared to the two post-FTA situations
(no merger and mergers).  In all cases the firms' marginal cost curves are those estimated for the
pre-FTA case, with output for each enterprise constrained by capacity.
Results
The Effects of Free Trade on Firm Output
The first column of Table 1 lists the firms present in 1985 and also reflects the mergers
after 1985.  For example, Prairie Malt merged with Schrier in 1989.  The second column in Table
1 lists the slopes for the marginal cost curves for each firm estimated from the pre-FTA equilibria.  
Columns three and four give the firm output levels and marginal costs estimated from the
pre-FTA regime.  The fifth and sixth columns give the outputs and marginal costs after FTA but
hold firm structure constant (allow no mergers).  Total industry output increases by over 6 percent
relative to that before FTA due to increased competition among the eleven firms.
The seventh and eighth columns give the post-FTA outputs and marginal costs after
accounting for the observed merger activity (from eleven to five firms).  The marginal costs are
now equal across previously separate enterprises (subject to capacity constraints), reflecting
optimal allocation of production.  
Prices, Profits, and Welfare
Table 2 presents the prices, quantities, and welfare measures for malt producers, malt
consumers, and barley producers in the three regimes.  The percentage changes in these economic9
variables as a result of FTA but without mergers are listed in the third column of Table 2.  The
malt price, the price for malting services, and producer surplus for malting firms decrease as firms
within the industry face increased competition.  Malt consumer surplus, malt barley producer
surplus, and malt barley price increase because of the increased industry output.  Total welfare
increases by 2 percent, as losses by the malting industry are more than offset by surplus gains
upstream and downstream from the firms.  
The percentage changes from the net effects of FTA, including industry mergers, are given
in the fifth column of Table 2. The percentage differences in the post-FTA situation created by
mergers are reported in the fourth column.  Mergers reduce the free trade gains to malt consumers,
malt barley producers, while the producer surplus in the malting industry increases. 
Merging firms decreased their output by about 21 percent relative to output before FTA,
while nonmerging firms increased their output by about 19 percent, reflecting the new Cournot
solution.  Merging firms increased producer surplus about 34 percent from the pre-FTA levels,
while nonmerging firms saw an approximate 7 percent increase in producer surplus relative to that
before FTA.  Relative to the pre-FTA period, malt production in Canada increased by over 12
percent, whereas in the U.S. malt production dropped slightly. 
Perhaps most notable is the increase in total (social) surplus when mergers occur. The
economic gain created by the reduced costs of merging firms more that offsets the augmentation of
market power.  Mergers created gains over and above those from free commodity trade.
We carried out a series of sensitivity analyses over our results but do not address them at
length due to space considerations. These analyses examined assumptions about cost synergies,
elasticities, and cost structure.  The important results for the sensitivity analyses are that (1) the10
quantitative results change in the expected direction, (2) the qualitative (sign) effects on economic
measures are unchanged across the quantitative changes, and (3) the magnitudes of the effects of
FTA are relatively robust to these sensitivity analyses.
Summary and Conclusions
Theories of comparative advantage can explain the expansion in trade after restrictions are
reduced or removed.   The substitution of capital and mobile factors of production for low-cost,
less mobile factors, such as labor, has also been studied extensively. In this paper we examine the
incentive for horizontal mergers across international borders when trade is liberalized.  For the
malting industry, we show that the observed mergers are consistent with an economic response to
the creation of the freer trade.  Using a simple Cournot oligopoly model, we show that although
these mergers reduce competition, they can have a welfare enhancing effect in our analysis. 
   In this paper we rely on the single example of Canadian  and U.S. malting industry for our
empirical content.  The question remains as to how general the effect of free trade on horizontal
mergers actually is.  If this process is a general phenomena we should see mergers occurring with
greater frequency in commodities that tend to be produced in oligopolistic industries, in
commodities where reduced trade costs have merged formally distinct markets, in countries that
have entered free trade agreements, and where interregional barriers are being removed. 
There is a need to examine in greater detail the potential effects of mergers stemming from
free trade, particularly when this freer trade is the result of bilateral or regional trade agreements. 
In our example, the mergers reduced non-industry welfare while enhancing firm welfare and total
welfare.  The potential does exist, however, that such mergers may more than offset the cost
savings stemming from free trade.  Under what conditions should mergers be facilitated?  Are11
there conditions under which the mergers should be blocked?  To what extent should competition
policy be amended to take these effects into account?  These are important policy questions that
need to be addressed.12
Table 1: Simulated firm-level effects of FTA and mergers (base case)















Can  0.050 225.5 11.2 281.8 14.0 281.8
1 20.8
Great Western
US 0.155 272.0 42.0 271.1 41.9 134.3 20.8
ConAgra 0.155 416.1 20.8
Schreir
US 0.717 100.0 71.7 87.8 62.9 72.5 52.0
Prairie Malt
Can 0.273 144.0 39.3 180.0 49.1 190.6 52.0
Prairie Malt/Schreier 0.198 263.1 52.0
Dominion Malt
Can 0.863 73.6 63.5 74.7 64.5 53.9 46.6
ADM
US 0.182 251.2 45.6 246.4 44.7 256.4 46.6
Dominion Malt/ADM 0.150 310.3 46.6
West Can
Can 0.876 72.8 63.8 73.7 64.6 52.5 46.0
Rahr
US 0.175 256.0 44.8 252.0 44.1 262.9 46.0
West Can/Rahl 0.146 315.3 46.0
Cargill/Ladish
US 0.024 452.0 11.0 524.6 12.8 565.0 13.8
Froedtert
US 0.141 284.0 40.0 285.8 40.2 321.6 45.3
Minnesota
US 1.271 61.6 78.3 52.7 67.0 59.3 75.4
Total 2192.7 2330.7 2250.9
1 Operating at the capacity constraint, marginal cost equal to the Great Western plants. 
Can Indicates plant location in Canada.
US Indicates plant location in the United States.13
Table 2: Simulated effects of free trade and mergers on the malting industry
 Without Combined 
Pre-FTA Merger Merger FTA & Merger
Economic Variable (base case)  Change change Change
Prices
1
Malting services                   89  -17.8% 12.5% -7.5%
Malt                 222  -5.1% 3.1% -2.1%
Barley                 133  3.1% -1.8% 1.3%
Quantity malted
Canadian locations                 516  18.3% -5.1% 12.2%
U.S. locations               1,677  2.6% -2.8% -0.3%
Merging firms               1,646  -10.9% -11.1% -20.7%
Nonmerging firms                 798  8.2% 9.6% 18.6%
Total quantity malted               2,193  6.3% -3.4% 2.7%
Malting industry producer surplus
Merging firms             94,497  -19.0% 66.0% 34.4%
Nonmerging firms              60,323  -13.5% 23.4% 6.7%
Total            154,820  -16.9% 48.7% 23.6%
Overall welfare effects
Malt consumer surplus           214,970  11.9% -6.2% 4.9%
Barley producer surplus             73,089  13.0% -6.7% 5.4%
Malting firm producer surplus           154,820  -16.9% 48.7% 23.6%
Total welfare           442,878  2.0% 9.3% 11.5%
1 Prices and quantities given on a dollar per metric ton basis.14
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